Water Law Review
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 35

9-1-2000

Mayor of Baltimore v. Susquehanna River Basin Comm'n, No.
WMN-98-3135, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8199 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2000)
John A. Helfrich

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
John A. Helfrich, Court Report, Mayor of Baltimore v. Susquehanna River Basin Comm'n, No.
WMN-98-3135, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8199 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2000), 4 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 198 (2000).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 4

access to the 1-10 interchange, which was specifically built for the
development site. The Corps' EA also said the development's
infrastructure and the interstate exchange would be able to handle
this increased traffic.
Third, the Corps conditioned THC's permit with mitigation. The
mitigation required THC to construct a 228-acre marsh open to the
lake. The court found the Corps' mitigation requirement reflected
consideration of cumulative impacts. However, mitigation alone was
not dispositive of sufficient analysis.
In addition, the administrative record contained extensive
comments by state and local agencies and private and public interests
groups. The Corps reflected on the comments and the court
concluded this demonstrated the Corps' analysis of relevant issues.
The court stated SOWL raised many legitimate concerns about the
However, the court
Corps' assessment of cumulative impacts.
concluded that despite SOWL's legitimate, good faith concerns about
the Corps' comprehensive assessment of cumulative impacts, these
concerns did not create a genuine issue of material fact concerning
the propriety of the Corps' issuance of the permit. The court granted
the Corps' and THC's motion for summary judgment, denied SOWL's
motion for summary judgment, and dismissed SOWL's claims against
Corps' and THC without prejudice.
Kirstin E. McMillan
Mayor of Baltimore v. Susquehanna River Basin Comm'n, No. WMN98-3135, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8199 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2000) (holding
the Susquehanna River Basin Commission was within its authority to
issue a "Determination Regarding Withdrawals and Diversions by the
City of Baltimore" ("the Determination") and denying the City of
Baltimore's request for summary judgment that the Determination was
null and void).
The City of Baltimore ("City") entered into an agreement in 1960
with the power company building the Conowingo Dam on the
Susquehanna River to withdraw water from the Conowingo Pool. The
agreement permitted the City to withdraw up to 250 million gallons
per day ("mgd") free of charge, with a more limited withdrawal during
low flow periods. In 1970, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania, the
three states within the Susquehanna River Basin ("Basin"), entered
into a compact ("Compact") to establish comprehensive planning,
The
programming, and management of the Basin's resources.
Susquehanna River Basin Commission ("Commission") administered
the Compact. The Commission's powers included the authority to
review and approve projects affecting the Basin's resources.
In 1998, the Commission held hearings on the potential impact of
future withdrawals or diversions from the Susquehanna River by the
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City. The result was a report entitled, "Determination Regarding
Withdrawals and Diversions by the City of Baltimore" ("the
Determination"). The City subsequently filed an action for summary
judgment with the District Court for the District of Maryland to have
the Determination declared null and void. The City based its position
on an absolute and unqualified right to withdraw 250 mgd from the
Conowingo Pool. The City asserted a preeminent right over of all
other Basin users that was not subject to regulation by the
Commission. The City raised four arguments in support of its
position. First, the "Maryland Reservation," a limitation inserted into
the Compact by the Maryland General Assembly, restricted the
Commission's authority to regulate withdrawals by the City. Second,
the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
preempted the Commission's authority. Third, the Determination was
inconsistent with the Commission's Comprehensive Plan. Fourth, the
Commission failed to explain adequately the reasoning upon which
they based the Determination. The court disagreed with each of these
arguments, denied the City's motion, and granted the Commission's
motion for summary judgment.
The court first determined the Maryland Reservation was at best a
failed attempt to amend the Compact. The language inserted into the
Compact by the Maryland Legislature asserted an unfettered right by
the City to withdraw 250 mgd from the Conowingo Pool. The other
signatories to the Compact were aware of this provision and did not
concur, as was required in order to amend the Compact. Thus, the
Maryland Reservation had no legal effect.
The City's second argument regarding preemption of the
Commission's authority by FERC asserted that a reservation to the
Compact ("reservation (w)"), gave FERC exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the appropriate elevations of the Conowingo Pool.
However, upon careful analysis of reservation (w) and related
congressional reports and documents, the court concluded reservation
(w), in fact, recognized the Commission's primary role in approving
projects that might affect Basin resources.
The court found some merit in the City's third argument that the
Determination was inconsistent with the Commission's Comprehensive
Plan. The conflict involved the definition of the City's "existing
diversion" in the Determination. Although the City's pipeline system
had a designed withdrawal capacity of 250 mgd, lack of installed
pumps limited its current withdrawal capacity to 137 mgd. Despite
identifying that the City's existing diversion as 137 mgd may be
misleading, the court found the definition of "existing diversion"
technically accurate as used in the Determination.
Finally, the court found the record did not support the City's
fourth argument asserting the Determination was arbitrary and
capricious. In fact, the court found the record replete with testimony
regarding potential adverse affects to the environment and other Basin
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users during periods of low flow, which is when coordinated
management of the Basin's resources would be most essential.
The court noted the preliminary nature of the Determination and
emphasized it was not the final word on any proposed City project. In
reviewing a project, the Commission must consider the City's overall
investment in the system, as well as the City's reasonable reliance on
the longstanding historic recognition of its anticipated use of 250 mgd.
Furthermore, any Commission decision is subject to judicial review.
The court determined the Commission would not be able to manage
the water resources of the basin effectively if it had no authority over
one of the largest users of those resources. Such a result would violate
the letter and the spirit of the Compact. Thus, the court held the
Commission was within its authority to issue the Determination and
denied the City's request for summary judgment that the
Determination was null and void.
John A. Helfrich
Purity Springs Resort v. TIG Ins. Co., No. 99-295-JD, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10918 (D. N.H. July 18, 2000) (holding an insurance company
may not deny coverage based on accidental pollution exclusions in a
liability policy when a deliberate release of water not alleged to be a
pollutant contaminates another water source).
Purity Springs Resort ("Purity") owned property that encompassed
Purity Lake, its outlet, and a dam at the outlet. Freedom Springs
("Freedom") operated a natural spring in Freedom, New Hampshire,
which was downstream from Purity. In March of 1997 and 1998, Purity
intentionally released water from its lake, which flooded Freedom's
springs and caused bacterial contamination. Purity sought coverage
for potential damages under its TIG Insurance Co. ("TIG") policy.
TIG denied coverage, arguing the policy specifically excluded damage
caused by deliberate pollution release. Purity sought a declaratory
judgment requiring TIG to provide coverage for Freedom's claims and
moved for summary judgment.
TIG objected to the summary
judgment motion based on the policy exclusion.
At trial, TIG contended the contamination of Freedom's water was
not a covered occurrence under its policy. "Occurrence" was defined
in the policy as "an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." TIG
claimed when Purity released water from its lake in 1998, such a
release was with the knowledge that the water would pollute Freedom's
water, as it had in 1997. The court found that because Purity had no
reason to anticipate damage to Freedom's property when it released
water in 1997, that occurrence was an accident within the meaning of
the policy issued by TIG. Therefore, the TIG policy covered the
damage caused by the 1997 occurrence regardless of whether the

